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The notion of forcing introduced by P. J. CoHEN [2] in order to prove 
the independence of the axiom of choice, may be considered as a modi-
fication of the notion of fulfilment of a formula by a tree introduced 
by E. W. BETH [l] p. 447. But the word "forcing" used by Cohen 
suggests an interesting philosophical interpretation of intuitionistic logic. 
According to this interpretation, which shall be described in detail, the 
intuitionistic logic can be understood as the logic of scientific research 
(rather positivistically conceived) while on the other hand the classical 
logic is the logic of ontological thought. 
l. The formal description of scientific research 
Scientific research (e.g. an experimental investigation) consists of the 
successive enrichment of the set of data by new established facts obtained 
by means of our method of inquiry. When making inquiries we question 
Nature and offer her a set of possible answers. Nature chooses one of 
them. Hence scientific research may be conceived as a triple 
R=(J, o, P). 
The elements of R will be called: J - the information set, i.e. the set 
of all possible experimental data, o - the initial information, P - the 
function of possible prolongations of the informations. 
The set J may be finite or infinite. The elements of J are finite ordered 
collections of atomic sentences: Pt1(aJ), Pt2(aJ> ak), ... where Ptn are 
n-place predicates and a1, ak, ... are object names. (The compound 
sentences are not a product of experiment, they arise from reasoning. 
This concerns also negations: we see that the lemon is yellow, we do 
not see that it is not blue.) 
The element o may be often considered as the empty collection. 
The function P is defined over the set J and assumes as values non-
empty subsets of J. For IX E J, P(1X) C J. Moreover if IX= (A1, ... ,An) 
where At are atomic sentences, then either P(1X) ={IX} or for every f3 E P(1X) 
there exist atomic sentences An+b ... , An+k+l (k;;;.O) such that 
{3 =(AI. ... , An, An+b ... , An+k+l)· 
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That is, the next state of scientific information contains the given one 
and a finite sequence of new atomic sentences. 
Hence research may be described as a tree: (Fig. 1}. 
Fig. 1. 
In performing an experimental trial we proceed from the point o along 
a branch gaining new data. If a branch is finite, the last information 
cannot be enlarged: P(y) = {y }. 
2. Inducing to assertion 
Now we define the relation: {3 >- IX ({3 is an extension of IX in the researchR). 
R 
0 n+l n {3 >-IX= {J=IX; {3 >-IX- v (y >-IX A {3 E P(y)) 
R . R y R 
1'1 
{3 >- IX = V {3 >- IX. 
R n R 
The fundamental notion: IX [> ([J (the information IX ~n the research R 
R 
forces (or induces) us to assert the formula ([J) is defined inductively. We 
shall consider two definitions; the simple one is adequate and exact 
for the sentential intuitionistic logic, the other is exact also for the 
quantification logic. 
Definition 1: 
1. If ([J is an atomic formula without variables then 
IX [> ([J = ([J E IX. 
2. For compound formulas: 1) 
IX [> r ([J V lJ'l = (IX [> ([J V IX [> lJ') 
IX [> r ([J A lJ'l - (IX [> ([J A IX [> lJ') 
1) The index R by the symbols >- and [> are omitted if there is no danger of 
confusion. 
598 
1\ (f3 >- 1X =* ,...._, (f3 [> (/))) 
fJ R 
~ 1\ (f3 >- ex=* ((3 [> W =? f3 [> P)) 
fJ R 
ex [> 1 V Xt W(xt) l ~ there exists a constant object name at such 
x; that ex [> W(xt(at) 
ex [> 1 1\ x; W(xt) l ~ for every object name at : ex [> W(xi(at). 
x; 
One can easily recognize here the essential points of Beth's definition. 
Cohen's definition differs from the above one in the case of general 
quantifier.) The positivistic methodological attitude is expressed for 
example in the case of negation: we are forced by our research to assert 
a negation --, (/)if this research never will force us to assert the statement (/). 
3. The interpretation of intuitionistic sentential logic 
We shall say that a triple R=(Jn, on, Pn) is a research if it satisfies 
the formal conditions of section l and all information is an extensions 
of the initial information o: 
One can prove easily the lemma: 
Lemma 1. If R=(Jn,on,Pn) ts a research, cxEJ, f3>-cx and 
ex [> W, then f3 [> W. 
Proof. By induction with respect to the length of the formula W. 
The proof of the following is sketched thus: 
Theorem l. A formula (/) (without quantifiers) is logically true in 
the formal intuitionistic logic if and only if each information ex of every 
research R forces us to assert the formula W. 
Proof. Using Lemma l we verify Heyting's axioms. For the converse 
inclusion let us recall Jaskowski's matrices for intuitionistic propositional 
calculus 2). They can be presented as the algebras of open sets on trees. 
Let T=(ST, oT, PT) be a tree: ST is the set of all ramification-points, 
oT is the top-point and PT is a function mapping ST into the class of 
subsets of ST. PT(x) CST for x EST. By means of PT we can define the 
relation >- as in section 2. 
T 
Then for subsets XC ST we define the interior function: 
(l) y E Int X Df 1\ x E ST(x-< y =* x EX). 
T 
Hence with every tree T we let AT be the corresponding algebra of 
open sets on T. If T contains only one point: S={o}, then AT is the 
2) See also G. F. RosE [5], and D. ScoTT [6J. 
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two element Boolean algebra. If T1 and T 2 are two disjoint trees, then 
T 1 +T2 will be the tree obtained from T1 and T2 by adding one new 
common top-point above T1 and T2. Hence every open set X of T1 +T2, 
except the whole space BT1+T2 , is the union of two disjoint parts 
X= (X n BT1 ) u (X n BT2 ) and may be considered as a pair: (X n BT1 , 
X n BT2). Thus the algebra AT1+T2 may be formally obtained from 
AT1 and AT2 by taking first the direct cartesian product of AT1 and AT2 
and then by adding one new open set containing all others. These two 
operations are according to JAsKOWSKI [4] sufficient to generate a 
characteristic set of matrices for the HEYTING's [3] formal intuitionistic 
calculus of propositions. 
Now we prove that for every finite set of atomic sentences A1, ... ,AN 
and for every finite tree T and valuation g of A1, ... , AN (by open sets 
in the algebra AT), there exists a research R isomorphic with T and such, 
that for every formula f/J (without quantifiers) built from A1, ... ,AN, 
we have the equality: 
(2) valg f/J = {x E BT: rp(x) 1> f/J} 
R 
where rp is the isomorphism of T onto R. 
The set BT being finite may be considered as ordered in such a way 
that if y E P(x) andy =1= x then x precedes y. Then we define the function 
rp by induction on the tree T: 
rp(oT) Df (Ai0, ••• , Aik) where Ai0 , ••• , Aik are all atomic sentences 
At ( 1 < i < N) such that oT E g(At), if they exist; 
rp(oT) Df (AN+l) if there is no At (l <;i<;N) such that oT E g(At). 
Suppose that rp(x)=(Bb ... , Bs) and y E P(x), y =1= x, we put: 
rp(y) Df (B1, ... , Bs, A10 , ••• , AJn) where AJ0 , ••• , A1n are all atomic 
sentences A 1 (l <i <;N) such that x ¢ g(A1) and y E g(AJ), if 
they exist; if not we put: 
rp(x) Df (B1, ... , Bs, Au), where Au is the first atomic sentence 
different from A 1, ... , AN and such that for every z E BT if 
z precedes y Au ¢ rp(z). 
The construction of the research R = ( J R, oR, P R) is the following: 
IX E J R Df v X E BT IX=tp(X), 
Df 
OR= tp(oT), 
IX E PR(fJ) nr V x, y E BT (x E PT(Y) A IX= rp(x) A {J = rp(y)). 
It is easy to see that R is a research, rp is an isomorphism, and for 
l < i < N the definitions imply the equality: 
g(At) = {x : "rp(x) 1> At}, 
R 
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which involves (2) for atomic sentences accordingly to the definition of 
valuation: valg(Ad=g(At), for At atomic. Suppose (2) for f!J and 'P we 
shall prove it for f!J ~ 'P. According to Tarski's interpretation method 
for intuitionistic connectives, and by (1) and (2) we have: 
valg(f!J ~ 'P) =Int((ST-valgf!J) u valg'P) = {x : (\ y(y >-- x =* 
T 
y E ((ST-valgf!J) u valg'P))}= {x : 1\ y(y >-- x =* 
T ' 
y E ((ST- {z : cp(z) [> f!J}) U {z : cp(z) [> 'P}))}= {x : A y(y >-- x =* 
· R R T 
(cp(y)·[> f!J=* cp(y) [> 'P))}={x: 1\ {J({J >-- cp(x)'* 
R R R 
({J [> @'*_ f3 [> 'P))}={x: cp(x) [> '@ ~ 'Pl}. 
R R R 
In the last two steps we profit by the fact that cp is an isomorphism 
and we use Definition l. 
For the other connectives the proof is similar. 
From (2) we obtain that: 
(3) valgf!J =ST = 1\ eX E J ReX [> f!J. 
R 
Hence if f!J is forced by· every information-state of every research R, 
then f!J is topologically true by every valuation in every finite tree. (The 
first inclusion may be also proved in this way instead of verifying the 
axioms.) 
This interpretation is not exact for the intuitionistic predicate calculus, 
e.g. the following rule is forced by every information state of every 
research: 1\ x(f!J v 'P(x)) ~ (f!J v 1\ x 'P(x)). (By Cohen's original definition 
even the rule 1\ xf!J(x) ~ f!J(a) is not satisfied.) 
4. The interpretation of the intp,itionistic predicate calculus 
In order to obtain an exact interpretation for the whole intuitionistic 
logic we must modify the definition of forcing in the following way: 
Definition 2 (informal version): 
'l. For atomic formulas: c:x [> At Df, irrespectively of how we continue 
our research R from the state c:x, we obtain an information containing the 
statement At 3). 
2. For compound formulas we modify Definition 1 only for disjunction 
and existential quantifier: 
c:x [> 'f!J v 'Pl Dr irrespectively of how we continue our research from 
the state c:x, we obtain an information f3 such that fJ [> f!J or 
fJ [> 'P; 
3 ) In the case of Definition 2 it may be better to say that "o.: [> <P" means: the 
R 
information state o.: of the research R potentially forces us to assert the statement <P. 
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IX [> rv Xi IP(xt) 1 Dr irrespective of how we continue our research from 
the state IX, we obtain an informaLion fJ such that for some 
a : fJ [> IP(a). 
To formalize Definition 2 we need the notion of branch: 
X is a branch of R=<J, o, P) Df XC J A o EX A 1\ IX (IX EX=:-
there exists one and only one fJ such that fJ E P(1X) and fJ EX). 
Then the phrase "irrespectively of how we continue our research R from 
the state IX we obtain an information fJ such that ... " may be formalized as 
"1\ X((X is a branch of R A ex EX)=:- V {J({J EX A ••• ))". And it is easy 
to see that, in the case of trees with P(1X) finite for every IX E J, this 
definition coincides with Beth's. 
Theorem 2 . A formula IP is provable in the formal intuitionistic 
logic of quantifiers if and only if IP is forced by each information of every 
research. 
Proof. First we prove by induction the lemma 1 and the following one: 
IX[> IP = 1\ X((X is a branch of R A IX EX)=:- V {J({J EX A fJ [> IP)). 
Using the lemmas we verify that all rules of the formal intuitionistic 
logic are forced by every information of every research. The converse 
inclusion follows from Beth's theorem. 
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